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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969' (NEPA)
requires agencies to consider the environmental consequences of
major federal actions that significantly affect the quality of the
human environment. 2 While scholars and courts have debated
whether NEPA should be understood as having primarily
substantive or primarily procedural force, neither group has
explored the relationship between NEPA and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) in great depth. More specifically, neither
group has focused on what role-if any-the APA might play in
fortifying NEPA's mandate.
Scholarship exploring this relationship has done so only by
dissecting Supreme Court precedent. In contrast, this Article
supplements scholarly discussion of Court precedent by proposing
an analytical framework for reviewing the processes required by
NEPA in light of the APA. The framework provides for a more
searching review of agency action, and suggests criteria for
evaluating an agency's procedures to determine whether it has
actually considered environmental factors in the decision-making
process. Viewed in this light, the APA potentially endows NEPA
with a substantive force that courts have not acknowledged in
NEPA itself. This framework acknowledges that courts cannot
overrule reasoned agency decisions,3 but asserts that judges must
do more than sign off on every decision for which the requisite
paperwork is prepared. Instead, courts should review the merits of
the process that influences the policy choice-a perspective that
implicates the APA's central concerns.
This Article addresses the possibility, under the prevailing
understanding of NEPA, that an agency might draft a
comprehensive report containing information about potential
environmental effects and alternate approaches to a proposed
plan-and then wholly disregard all of this information in making
its final decision. Although an agency may contend that it has
"considered" the environmental consequences of alternative
courses of action, what if these factors have no actual impact on its
final decision? Hypothetically, an agency could simply "steamroll"4
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 432147 (2005).
2. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
3. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
4. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 1989) ("The difficulty of
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toward its preferred decision, hurdling NEPA's procedural
obstacles without genuinely considering potential environmental
harms or the means to avoid them.
This Article questions whether formally including
environmental factors in decision-making documents, but paying
them no real heed, violates the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of the APA.5 If so, courts should engage in a more searching
review, allowing their analysis to be informed by the APA's
mandates.
Part II of this Article provides historical background and
explains how lower courts, the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), and scholars have interpreted NEPA to have substantive
power. Part III explains how the Supreme Court, unlike other
institutions, has interpreted NEPA to be a strictly procedural
statute that lacks much substantive force, mandates certain
processes, but requires no substantive changes in decision-making.
Part IV discusses the history of the APA, a statute, like NEPA,
designed to ensure fully informed and explicated decision-making
by administrative agencies. Part V examines the tension between
the APA and the Supreme Court's NEPA jurisprudence, and
concludes that despite the Supreme Court's restrictive
interpretation of NEPA, an agency's failure to give any weight to
environmental considerations in the decision-making process
would be insufficient under the APA. This Part then suggests
indicators for determining whether agencies have given
appropriate weight to requisite NEPA concerns. Finally, Part VI
provides an example of how these indicators might be applied. By
considering this framework, and taking the APA into account,
courts can prevent agencies from going through the NEPA process
without substantively engaging environmental concerns.
II. DOES NEPA HAVE SUBSTANTIVE FORCE?
Enacted in 1970, NEPA "mandated major changes in the
decisionmaking processes of federal agencies."6 The Act's goals
include protecting the environment for future generations,
stopping a bureaucratic steamroller, once started, still seems to us ... a perfectly proper
factor for a district court to take into account in assessing that risk, on a motion for a
preliminary injunction.").
5. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2005).
6. Jason J. Czarnezki, Defining the Project Purpose under NEPA: Promoting Consideration of
Viable EIS Alternatives, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 599, 599 (2003).
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assuring safe and healthy surroundings for all Americans,
preserving natural resources, and promoting recycling and the use
of renewable resources.7 Section 101 of NEPA requires agencies to
"use all practicable means" to fulfill NEPA's goals.' Specifically,
NEPA mandates comprehensive scientific and systematic analysis
of environmental problems, and imposes procedural requirements
to generate information for agency and public benefit.9 Under the
statute, agencies must produce a publicly available environmental
impact statement (EIS) that discusses the potential environmental
consequences of each proposed project, mitigation measures, and
alternatives to the proposed action, and lists any irretrievable
commitments of resources involved.1
Some appellate courts have suggested that pursuant to NEPA,
decision-making agencies must give substantial weight to
environmental considerations. For example, Judge Skelly Wright's
famous decision in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission indicated that agencies must take
environmental considerations seriously, weighing economic and
technical benefits of a planned action against potential
environmental costs." Under this interpretation, an EIS may not
merely "accompany" an application through the review process
while receiving no actual consideration. Instead, agencies must
engage in case-by-case balancing, taking all alternatives into
account so that "each agency decision maker has before him and
takes into proper account all possible approaches to a particular
project (including total abandonment of the project) which would
alter the environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance.""3
Some courts have gone further, suggesting that under NEPA,
environmental factors must be given "determinative weight"'4 and
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2005).
8. Id.
9. Czarnezki, supra note 6, at 599.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
11. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("In each individual case, the particular economic and
technical benefits of planned action must be assessed and then weighed against the
environmental costs; alternatives must be considered which would affect the balance of
values.").
12. Id. at 1117 (calling the mere accompaniment of environmental data a "mockery
of the Act").
13. Id.at1114.
14. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980)
(quoting Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1978)) (stating that the court below
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must "tip the balance" in agency decision-making. 5 Procedurally,
this might involve monetizing environmental factors and
employing cost-benefit analysis, 6  or requiring discussion of
maximum mitigation measures. 7
In Sierra Club v. Marsh, Judge (now Justice) Breyer announced
that NEPA is concerned with a lack of ex ante consideration that
could lead to real harm to America's natural resources. 8 The harm
is not to the procedural requirements of NEPA but to the
environment-that is, substantive harm. According to Breyer,
NEPA is meant to ensure a decision-making process built on
informed awareness of a plan's likely effect on the environment. 9
The idea behind NEPA is to "present[] governmental decision-
makers with relevant environmental data before they commit
themselves to a course of action."2" After all, "[i]t is far easier to
influence an initial choice than to change a mind already made
up." Thus, courts have suggested that NEPA's procedures should
promote substantive changes in decision-making.2"
NEPA is also viewed in a substantive light by the Council on
required that "environmental factors ... be given determinative weight").
15. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 100
(1983) (noting that the D.C. Circuit required envirohmental uncertainties to "tip the
balance"). For other expansive views of NEPA, see Environmental Def. Fund v. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972) (stating that NEPA is "more than an
environmental full-disclosure law" and "was intended to effect substantive changes in
decision-making"); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665
(4th Cir. 1973) (agreeing with the Eighth Circuit).
16. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.4, 860 et seq. (2d ed. 2000)
(citing Daniel Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278 (1993)).
17. Id. at 862. ("Where the issue is one of the extent of the damage expected, it calls
for best efforts to avoid it and maximum efforts to mitigate it.").
18. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 1989) ("But the risk implied
by a violation of NEPA is that real environmental harm will occur through inadequate
foresight and deliberation.").
19. Id. at 500.
20. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1983)).
21. Id.
22. Lower courts, for example, have given NEPA substantive force by finding
discussions of mitigation measures procedurally defective. See, e.g., Stein v. Barton, 740
F.Supp. 743, 754 (D. Alaska 1990) ("[W]here an agency's decision to proceed with a
project is based on unconsidered, irrational, or inadequately explained assumptions about
the efficacy of mitigation measures, the decision must be set aside as 'arbitrary and
capricious"'); Friends of the Earth v. Hall, 693 F.Supp. 904, 939 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
("Where an EIS fails to contain a detailed mitigation plan, the agency fails to meet its
touchstone obligation of fostering informed decisionmaking and informed public
participation.") (emphasis in original).
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 25:3
Environmental Quality (CEQ),25 an organization created under
NEPA to report on the quality of America's environment. 4 CEQ
has issued regulations and guidance interpreting NEPA to require
decision-makers to "emphasize real environmental issues and
alternatives. 2 5 CEQ's NEPA regulations require agencies to
balance environmental considerations in the decision-making
process 26  and to use all means to avoid and minimize
environmental harm.27 This is consistent with the language of
NEPA, which creates "action forcing" devices designed to "insure"
that environmental concerns are "infused into the ongoing
programs and actions of the Federal Government. 2 s CEQ has not
eliminated the possibility that courts examine the provisions of
NEPA and give them substantive weight.29 The CEQ regulations are
entitled to substantial deference by the courts,"° and require
agencies to avoid adverse environmental effects and to restore or
enhance the environment.3'
23. Despite CEQ's NEPA regulations, courts must still engage in hard look review of
NEPA decision-making processes because these regulations are not entitled to Chevron
deference. Czarnezki, supra note 6, at 610 n.87 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 893-95 (2001) (implicitly stating that the
CEQ regulations are not entitled to Chevron deference because the CEQ lacks substantive
rulemaking authority and no single agency is charged with the enforcement of NEPA).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (2005).
25. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(b) (2005).
26. 1980 CEQ ENVTL. QUALITY ANN. REP. 11, at 376 (stating that courts must
determine whether the actual balance of costs and benefits was arbitrary or clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental values).
27. See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b)-(c) (2005) ("An agency shall identify and discuss all
such factors including any essential considerations of national policy which were balanced
by the agency in making its decision and state how those considerations entered into its
decision.... [and] [s]tate whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize
environmental harm from the alternative selected have been adopted, and if not, why they
were not.").
28. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2005) ("The primary purpose of an environmental impact
statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals
defined in the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal
Government.").
29. 1980 CEQ ENVTL. QUALITY ANN. REP. 11, at 376 (endorsing the view that agency
action be set aside when there are substantive reasons mandated by statute).
30. Jennifer R. Bartlit, An Adequate EIS Under NEPA: Deference to CEQ" Merely Conceptual
Listing of Mitigation Leads Us to a Merely Conceptual National Environmental Policy, 31 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 653, 658 (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) ("CEQ's
interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference.")); Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 23, at 895 n.5 (noting that the CEQ regulations are entitled to Skidmore deference).
31. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F. 2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972)
(citing CEQ guidelines in 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (Apr. 23, 1971)) (agreeing with CEQ that
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In addition to the CEQ many scholars agree that NEPA was
intended to have both substantive and procedural requirements 2
and that enforcing both would make the statute a more effective
tool for environmental justice.33 Some have maintained that NEPA
refocuses agency decision-making on rights to environmental
quality.' Still others have argued that Congress should bolster and
clarify NEPA's language in order to ensure the intended
substantive, not merely procedural, enforcement in the courts.
These scholarly, judicial, and CEQ interpretations of NEPA
are, moreover, in accord with sound environmental policy, as
substantive interpretation of NEPA places a beneficial check on
mission-oriented agencies. Yet, neither NEPA itself, nor any other
environmental or administrative statute, provides for an
independent individual or administrative body to take a hard look
at an agency's decision-making process;36 there is no NEPA
supervisor." Instead, that role falls to the courts.37 At the same
NEPA is a substantive statute).
32. See, e.g., Bernard S. Cohen & Jacqueline M. Warren, Judicial Recognition of the
Substantive Requirements of NEPA, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 685, 702 (1972) ("[T]he
failure to require compliance with [NEPA's substantive policies] will lead ultimately to
frustration of the legislative purpose of NEPA."); see also Harvey Bartlett, Is NEPA
Substantive Review Extinct, or Merely Hibernating? Resurrecting NEPA Section 102(1), 13 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 411, 415 (2000) (interpreting NEPA as continuing to supply substantive law
despite Supreme Court precedent); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither N/EPA? 12 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 333, 342 (2004) (stating that the "legalist critic" view of NEPA is that the
statute's application is "too anemic," since NEPA was intended to have both substantive
and procedural requirements).
33. Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA 's in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 30
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 565, 596 (1997) (arguing that CEQ should use NEPA's procedural and
substantive requirements to help aid social justice).
34. See William Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA 's Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in
the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L. J. 205, 260-61 (1989) (promoting
administrative modifications so that agencies will make decisions that more faithfully
adhere to NEPA).
35. Philip Weinberg, It's Time to Put N/EPA Back on Course, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 116
(1994) (asserting that NEPA must be amended to make its substantive mandate clear);
Philip M. Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law
Adaptations from NEPA's Progeny, 16 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 207, 230 (1992) (arguing that the
substantive portions of NEPA should be revitalized).
36. Unlike, for example, Australia, which requires (at the Commonwealth level) that
an environmental minister approve assessed projects. See Australian Government,
Department of the Environment and Heritage, Assessments and Approvals (2005),
http://www.deh.gov.au/epbc/assessmentsapprovals (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (on file
with author). There is some question as to the effectiveness of such supervisors-an issue
which will not be addressed here.
37. This concern is a justification for the APA, a statute designed to stop agencies
from ignoring relevant considerations without a rational basis. See Part IV infra.
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time, "NEPA's legislative history indicates that Congress was
concerned with the potentially self-serving missions of individual
agencies, and therefore sought to limit agency discretion:,
38
It is a simple fact of life that policies of agencies of the Federal
Government may and do conflict: it is equally true that there are
occasions where, without the benefit of conflicting policies, these
Government agencies may and do adopt courses that appear to
conflict with the general public interest."
Yet, it is not altogether clear that this concern of Congress
translates into an empowerment of courts to watch over agencies.
A standard criticism of this guardian role is that the courts lack the
relevant expertise to question an agency decision. This argument
might have merit if NEPA required courts to sign off on each
agency action, but courts are in a good position to evaluate
decision-making processes, since this evaluation involves no
technical expertise." Perhaps rigorous review of agency process
also holds the potential to lead to substantive decision-making
change .41
III. Is NEPA PURELY PROCEDURAL?
Despite lower courts' historical willingness to engage in
substantive review of the weight granted to environmental factors
under NEPA-and despite the views of CEQ and legal scholars-
the goals of NEPA have had difficulty gaining substantive
enforcement by the United States Supreme Court. The Court has
"refused to engage in any substantive review of the weight to be
given to the environmental factors enumerated in section 101 of
NEPA."42 Indeed, NEPA has an 0-15 record before the Court; it has
"never decided a case, or for that matter a single issue in a case, in
favor of a NEPA plaintiff."43
38. Czarnezki, supra note 6, at 612.
39. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, H.R. Rep. No. 91-378 (1969),
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2753-54.
40. These circumstances are discussed in Part V infra.
41. SeePart V infra.
42. Charmian Barton, Aiming at the Target: Achieving the Objects of Sustainable
Development in Agency Decision-Making, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REV. 837, 886 (2001).
43. David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA ? Some Possible Explanations for
a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVrL. L. 551, 553 & n.6 (1990). Since publication of Shilton's article, the
Court has ruled against NEPA in at least three more cases, bringing the record to 0 wins,
15 losses. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004); Dep't of Transp. v.
Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
[Vol. 25:3
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Moreover, the Court has played a major role in limiting the
scope of NEPA. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen44 is
typically cited for the proposition that NEPA is strictly a
"procedural" statute." In its per curiam opinion, the Court held
that an agency's decision withstood challenge under NEPA simply
because the agency complied with NEPA's procedures and
considered the EIS-even though environmentally friendlier
alternatives existed. The Second Circuit had held below that the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's selection
of a construction site for a low and middle income housing facility
was outweighed by adverse urban environmental effects.46
However, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the interpretation
that "environmental factors.., should be given determinative
weight.
47
On the contrary, once an agency has made a decision subject to
NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to
insure that the agency has considered the environmental
consequences; it cannot "interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be
taken. 48
The Supreme Court stated that an agency need not elevate
environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations,
and offered no guidance regarding the extent to which
environmental factors should be addressed by an agency.49
Nine years later, in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
the Court further clarified its view that NEPA is purely procedural:
If the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are
adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not
constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh
the environmental costs. In this case, for example, it would not
have violated NEPA if the Forest Service, after complying with the
Act's procedural prerequisites, had decided that the benefits to
be derived from downhill skiing at Sandy Butte justified the
issuance of a special use permit, notwithstanding the loss of 15
percent, 50 percent, or even 100 percent of the mule deer herd.
44. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
45. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). See also Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
46. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 227-28. See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
49. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227.
20061
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Other statutes may impose substantive environmental obligations on
federal agencies, but NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather
than unwise-agency action.5 °
Unfortunately, while the Court stated that NEPA will
"inevitably bring pressure to bear on agencies 'to respond to the
needs of environmental quality,' 51 it provided no mechanism
through which to enforce such a response and referred to the
environmental polices listed in section 101 of NEPA as merely
"precatory."5 Such an interpretation appears to fly in the face of
other NEPA provisions, which direct that NEPA's goals be
implemented "to the fullest extent possible."5 It also seems to flout
CEQ regulations that require agencies to "[s]tate whether all
practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from
the alternative selected have been adopted, and if not, why they
were not."54
A possible reconciliation of these two points is that the Court
believes that NEPA's procedural mandates are sufficient to
safeguard against substantively problematic agency decisions. But if
so, then it must provide some mechanism for NEPA to be more
than a "paper tiger."55 The Court first says that the statutory
provisions of NEPA only require that the proper procedures are
followed, and second, that the statutory provisions of NEPA do not
require any review of the agency decision. However, as will be
discussed in the following section, integrating the APA with NEPA
provides such a mechanism, upholding the mandates of both sets
of statutes. Courts should be required to review whether significant
environmental risks were factors in the decision to undertake a
proposed action-that is, to undertake substantive analysis in
addition to ensuring that NEPA's procedures were followed.
50. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (emphases
added).
51. Id. at 349 (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 40425 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Muskie)).
52. Id. It is not uncommon for members of the Court to consider statutory provisions
as expressing a desire but not creating a legal obligation or affirmative duty. See Indus.
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 631 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) ("Read literally, the relevant portion of § 6(b) (5) [of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act] is completely precatory .... "); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441
(1987) ("IT]he provision is precatory; it does not require the implementing authority
actually to grant asylum to all those who are eligible.").
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c).
55. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger.").
[Vol. 25:3
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IV. THE APA's ROLE
Created by a group of scholars and practitioners "on the basis
of many years of meticulous study of the legal system, the political
structure of the government, the roles played by agencies, and the
decision making procedures used by agencies,"56  the
Administrative Procedure Act57 is "a remedial statute that is
designed to insure uniformity, impartiality and fairness in the
procedures employed by federal administrative agencies."" The
APA requires agencies to keep the public informed of agency
procedures and rules, provides for public participation in the
rulemaking process, and prescribes uniform standards for the
conduct of formal rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings. 9
Under the APA, which governs judicial review of NEPA,6"
agency decisions will be overturned if they are "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."6' Originally described in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, the arbitrary and capricious test of section 706(2) (a)
requires agencies to engage in careful consideration of relevant
factors in the decision-making process.62 The Supreme Court
clarified Overton Park in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, in which it explicitly
held that courts are required to take a "hard look"63 at the
56. Richard Pierce Jr., Symposium, The APA and Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 81, 82 (1996) (citing KENNETH C. DAviS & RICHARD PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE § 1.4 (3d ed. 1994)).
57. Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706,
1305, 3105, 3344, 5372.
58. 2 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 2:1 (2005) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2004)), Universal Camera
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Pan Ad. S.S. Corp. v. Ad. Coast Line R. Co., 353
U.S. 436 (1957); Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Malonee, 196 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1952);
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs,
Dep't. of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199
(1974)).
59. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act 9 (2005), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/apa/refrnc/agOl.htm#a
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
60. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1989) ("We
conclude that review of the narrow question before us whether the Corps' determination
that the FEISS need not be supplemented should be set aside is controlled by the
,arbitrary and capricious' standard of § 706(2) (A) [of the APA].").
61. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2005).
62. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
63. This hard look takes place "within the framework of normal arbitrary and
capricious review." Shilton, supra note 43, at 563, n.53.
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environmental effects of their proposed action.' This doctrine
provides for searching judicial review, requiring agencies to offer a
clear explanation of the weight they give to various factors in the
decision-making process.6' An action will be deemed arbitrary and
capricious if an agency has relied on factors that Congress did not
intend it to consider, has failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, or has offered an explanation that either runs
counter to the evidence with which the agency was presented or is
so implausible that it cannot be the honest result of an impartial
decision-making process.66
Courts are required to closely scrutinize the decisional record;67
indeed, the hard look doctrine was adopted in part because of
distrust of agencies.' While the Supreme Court has rejected Judge
David Bazelon's "procedural" hard look view of the APA, which
suggests that courts should make "sure that the administrative
procedures were fulsome enough to guarantee truth-finding,"69 it
arguably supports the "substantive" hard look view advanced by
Bazelon's colleague on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Harold Leventhal. 7
Leventhal's approach suggests that courts must review agency
action to ensure that agencies engaged in reasoned, not merely
64. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976) (citing Natural Res. Def. Council
v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
65. Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the
Environment, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 223 & n.72 (1987) (citing Cass Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61 (1985)) (arguing that the hard look
doctrine demands "that the agency accompany its decision with a clear explanation of the
factors considered, the weights assigned to them, and the reasons they dictated the
decision ultimately adopted"). See also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S.
156 (1962) (stating that an agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action, including a "rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made")).
66. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43-44.
67. Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(explaining that hard look review is a rigorous standard ofjudicial review).
68. See Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of the
Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599, 2599 (2002) ("In part, hard look
review resulted from pervasive distrust of administrative agencies and the growth of public
interest regulation.").
69. Patricia M. Wald, Thirty Years of Administrative Law in the D.C. Circuit (2005),
http://www.dcbar.org/for%5Flawyers/sections/administrative-law-and-agency-practice/
wald.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
70. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 29. This hard look takes place "within the framework of
normal arbitrary and capricious review." Shilton, supra note 43, at 563 n.53.
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informed, decision-making.7 This approach, according to Judge
Patricia Wald, requires agencies to articulate "in the best possible
way the reasons why the agency is making its hard choices."7 2 Thus,
the APA, as interpreted and implemented both by courts and by
comprehensive agency documentation, provides a check against
arbitrariness on mission-oriented73 agencies that might otherwise
fail to consider environmental risks in pursuing a project.7"
V. GIVING WEIGHT TO ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS UNDER NEPA
AND THE APA
What if agencies give no weight to environmental factors in the
decision-making process? Stycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen indicates that even if less weight is given to environmental
factors than to other considerations, the decision does not violate
NEPA as long as environmental factors have been "considered" by
the agency.75 This requirement is satisfied as long as, at a
minimum, the factors are included in the required and prepared
procedural documents and recognized by the agency-even if they
do not affect the final decision.76 Thus, despite NEPA's ambitious
textual mandates,77 construction has rendered its requirements
71. Wald, supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).
74. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1686 (2004); Harold Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 555 (1974) ("The rule of
administrative law, as applied to congressional mandates for a clean environment, ensures
that mission-oriented agencies, where NEPA is applied, will take due cognizance of
environmental matters."). In other words, judicial review, in addition to political
accountability, is necessary for agency legitimacy.
75. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980) ("[T]he only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the
environmental consequences .... ); see also Andreen, supra note 34, at 210 ("The missing
link is that the agency which prepared the EIS may or may not actually use that document
in framing its ultimate decision .... Having 'considered' the environmental impacts of the
proposal, therefore, an agency can do just about anything it chooses.").
76. This is not to say such information can be merely included but not looked at. See,
e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (indicating that it is not "enough that environmental data and
evaluations merely 'accompany' an application through the review process, but receive no
consideration").
77. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 2, 83 Stat. 852
(1970).
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largely procedural.7" Under NEPA's existing interpretations, courts
will not "set aside an agency's decision on the basis that it gave
insufficient weight to the substantive objectives of NEPA."79 The
Supreme Court has ruled that an agency's substantive decision will
not be overturned if it was based on full and good faith
consideration, and "a court may not set up a different standard in
reviewing agency compliance with NEPA's mandate than would be
required under the APA."8° Yet the APA allows courts to take a
"hard look" at agency decisions to ensure that they are not
"arbitrary and capricious." This gives the APA a role in the judicial
determination of compliance with NEPA. This role must be
defined in the NEPA context in order to evaluate the "absolute"
weight given to environmental considerations (i.e., the amount of
weight given to environmental factors alone, absent comparing
environmental risks with other risks and benefits).
It is fairly clear that giving at least some weight to environmental
factors is sufficient to satisfy the APA's requirements.8 "Some
argue that the Court's failure to consider the weight given to
environmental factors by agencies leaves out the 'clear error of
judgment' factor of the arbitrary and capricious test established in
Overton Park."2 But so long as an agency decision is reasoned and
informed, giving too little weight to environmental factors will
never constitute clear error.83 The notion that courts are ill-
78. See Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); see also Part III, supra.
79. Barton, supra note 42, at 887 (citing Richard I. Goldsmith & William C. Banks,
Environmental Values: Institutional Responsibility and the Supreme Court, 7 HARv. ENVrL. L.
REV. 1, 12-13 (1983), infra note 81).
80. Lawrence R. Liebesman, The Council on Environmental Quality's Regulations to
Implement the National Environmental Policy Act-Will They Further NEPA's Substantive
Mandate?, 10 ENvTL. L. REP. 50,039, 50,042 (1980) (citing Letter from CEQ General
Counsel Nicholas C. Yost to Philip Cummings, Counsel, Comm. on Env. and Public Works,
U.S. Senate (Feb. 4, 1980)).
81. "Strycker's Bay thus holds that a federal court may not set aside agency action as
'arbitrary and capricious' on the theory that the agency gave insufficient weight to the
substantive goals enumerated in NEPA." Richard I. Goldsmith & William C. Banks,
Environmental Values: Institutional Responsibility and the Supreme Court, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1983).
82. Barton, supra note 42, at 887 (citing Goldsmith & Banks, supra note 81, at 12). See
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding that in
reviewing agency decisions, courts must consider "whether the decision was based on a
consideration of relevant factors and whether there ha[d] been a clear error of
judgment.").
83. See Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S at 227 (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558) (stating
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equipped to second-guess the cost-benefit calculations of
environmental harms that agencies utilize in making decisions
supports this result. However, since courts are in a good position
to evaluate the decision-making process, they may be well suited to
decide on whether any weight has been given. A conclusion that
an agency gave no weight to environmental factors differs from a
conclusion that environmental factors were given comparatively
too little weight; in the former case, the determination is that
regardless of the "considered" environmental effects, the potential
severity of these effects would not change the agency's decision.
Indeed, courts should review decision-making processes (a
concern of both NEPA and the APA) to ensure that environmental
factors carry at least some weight-a very different prospect than
second-guessing agency decision-making. After all, even given a
requirement that agencies "consider" environmental
consequences, substantive review of agency action under NEPA is
still required under the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
NEPA establishes a set of factors relevant to an agency's decision. It
would be arbitrary to give no substantive weight to those factors,
and would allow an agency to disregard environmental factors
altogether while jumping through NEPA's procedural hoops. In
his Strycker's Bay dissent, Justice Marshall wrote:
Further, I do not subscribe to the Court's apparent suggestion
that Vermont Yankee limits the reviewing court to the essentially
mindless task of determining whether an agency "considered"
environmental factors even if that agency may have effectively
decided to ignore those factors in reaching its conclusion ....
Our cases establish that the arbitrary-or-capricious standard
prescribes a "searching and careful" judicial inquiry designed to
ensure that the agency has not exercised its discretion in an
unreasonable manner.
Although Marshall disagrees with the majority's interpretation
of NEPA, his conclusion is sound under an APA analysis; it would
be arbitrary and capricious to give no weight to environmental
factors in light of NEPA's mandate that agencies use "all
practicable means" to protect the environment. The APA allows
for a searching review of the administrative decision-making
process-a review that has the potential to reveal an agency's
failure to give weight to environmental factors.
that NEPA is designed "to insure fully informed and well-considered decisions").
84. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Overton Park 401
U.S. at 416).
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Perhaps this type of review is what Justice O'Connor was
advocating in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,s5 decided just three years after Strycker's Bay. In
Baltimore Gas, the Court held it permissible to develop a generic
determination of the environmental consequences of spent
nuclear fuel, and that individual proceedings were not required.86
The question for the Court was not whether environmental risks
should affect a decision at all, but how risks should be assessed-
that is, by general rule or individual analysis. Thus, the majority
held that "an agency must allow all significant environmental risks
to be factored into the decision whether to undertake a proposed
action."87 This is commensurate with the prevailing views of lower
courts and the CEQ and is not inconsistent with the majority's
holding in Strycker's Bay. In fact, in Stycker's Bay, the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development conceded, "if an agency gave...
no weight to environmental values its decision might be arbitrary
and capricious."88 The majority's statement in Baltimore Gas comes
close to granting NEPA substantive force under the APA's
85. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87 (1983).
86. The Court wrote:
Here, the agency has chosen to evaluate generically the environmental impact of the fuel
cycle and inform individual licensing boards, through the Table S-3 rule, of its evaluation.
The generic method chosen by the agency is clearly an appropriate method of conducting
the hard look required by NEPA. The environmental effects of much of the fuel cycle are
not plant specific, for any plant, regardless of its particular attributes, will create additional
wastes that must be stored in a common long-term repository. Administrative efficiency
and consistency of decision are both furthered by a generic determination of these effects
without needless repetition of the litigation in individual proceedings, which are subject to
review by the Commission in any event.
Id. at 100-01 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 100.
88. Stiycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 231 n.* (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. 223 (No. 79-184), at 15 n.16). One could also
argue that the majority's footnote indicates that it did not understand the Second Circuit
to have found the agency's action arbitrary and capricious. Stlycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 228
n.2. Some have concluded on the basis of this footnote that a reviewing court is not
forbidden from "setting aside or modifying action [as] ... arbitrary and capricious as
tested by the APA and the substantive goals and policies of section 101 (b) of NEPA." U.S.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 26, at 376. Going this far may be
inconsistent with the procedural history of the Second Circuit which concluded the agency
had acted arbitrarily, see Goldsmith & Banks, supra note 81, at 10-11 (citing Strycker's Bay,
444 U.S. 228), but it is difficult to ignore the express language of the Court. While it is
tempting to circumvent the Court's holding through this footnote, neither interpretation
adversely affects the suggestion that giving no weight to environmental concerns would
violate the APA.
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arbitrariness standard; any decision would be unreasonable if no
weight was given to environmental risks. This is an APA solution to
making environmental concerns an integral part of agency
decision-making, and goes well beyond the Court's construction of
NEPA by itself.
Although a court must respect agency discretion (even if it
finds contrary views more persuasive), a reviewing court is still
required to undertake a "searching and careful" review of the
administrative record. 9 Courts can discern whether an agency has
given no weight to environmental consequences or to project
alternatives by invoking the hard look doctrine-the judicial
mechanism that determines whether an agency decision-making
process was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. ° Specifically,
the hard look doctrine provides a heightened, more searching
scope of judicial review, and demands that agency decisions
contain a clear explanation of how much weight has been assigned
to different factors considered in the decision-making process."
Agencies must exercise their authority through the processes
required by the APA, and NEPA "supplement[s] rather than
displace[s] the APA's requirements.92 The APA, as interpreted in
Overton Park, "represents a transition from political to judicial
controls over decisions"93  where political controls prove
insufficient, or where a court might interpret NEPA as "soft law,"94
merely requiring the production of information. The APA shifts
89. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (quoting Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 416).
90. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (explaining that the
court's role "is to insure the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental
consequences .. "). This hard look takes place "within the framework of the normal
arbitrary and capricious review." Shilton, supra note 43, at 562 n.53.
91. Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the
Environment, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 209, 223, & 253 n.72 (1987) (citing Cass Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61 (1985)).
92. Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A
Reconciliation, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 35, 37 (1996).
93. Peter L. Strauss, Administrative Law Stories: Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
(Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 267, 2004) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=650482 (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
94. Cf Louise G. Trubek, Symposium, Public Interest Lauyers and New Governance:
Advocating for Healthcare, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575, 600 (2002) ("In response to the criticism
that there cannot be law without regulation, or a sanctioning system that will require
people to follow the system, is the recent discussion of 'soft law.' Soft law is a term used to
refer to guidelines, recommendations, policy suggestions, and other government systems
designed to influence behavior without imposing formal legal obligations.").
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the remedy out of politics and back to the judicial branch. Thus,
even if, as the Supreme Court has held, NEPA does not demand
particular substantive results,9 5 the APA can determine what it
means to comply with that process.
Courts should review the administrative record to determine
whether an agency failed to give weight to environmental
consequences. (In some cases, courts will be required to engage in
extra record review. 6) This can be assessed by "comparing what is
in [the] administrative record with what is not." 7 But what
information might suggest a failure to weigh environmental risks?
A number of these "steamroll" indicators can be considered
collectively, including: (1) whether the agency exhibited tunnel
vision" or strong-armed its way towards a preferred outcome;9 (2)
95. STEVE FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 70 (2d ed.
2001).
96. Extra record review may be necessary to determine whether an agency has
considered all relevant factors and explained its decision, or whether it has acted in bad
faith. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1997) (declaring extra
record investigation "appropriate" when "there has been a strong showing in support of a
claim of bad faith or improper behavior on the part of the agency decisionmakers or
where the absence of formal administrative findings makes such investigation necessary in
order to determine the reasons for the agency's choice .... " (citing Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971))). See also Sw. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating the conditions
under which extra-record review is permissible); Sabine River Auth. v. Dep't of Interior,
951 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 1992) (providing for review of evidence in addition to the
administrative record to determine whether the agency adequately considered the
environmental effects of a particular project); Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal
Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of
Overton Park's Requirement ofJudicial Review "On the Record, "10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 227
(1996). However, extra record review is somewhat "at odds with the norms of
administrative law and typical judicial review of agency action." Lands Council v. Powell,
379 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has advanced the general rule that
judicial review of agency decisions is limited to the administrative record. See Florida Power
& Light Co. v. Loion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985). However, there are exceptions to this
rule which are more frequently made in review of agency NEPA decisions than in review of
other agency decisions. See Hoffman, 132 F.3d at 14 (citing Susannah T. French, Comment,
Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REV. 929, 955-76
(1993)).
97. Young, supra note 96, at 227. Unlike what happens in practice, "[f]rom a
descriptive point of view.., the Supreme Court's general model for arbitrary and
capricious review is more constraining than the model for review permitted under NEPA."
Id.
98. Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
("In limiting the scope of its inquiry, the Corps acted improperly and contrary to the
mandates of NEPA. The Corps' decision to assess only those impacts physically dependent
upon activities within its redefined jurisdiction, i.e., the river and its immediate banks, was
tantamount to limiting its assessment to primary impacts. The Corps proceeded to assess
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whether the agency ignored scientific data related to
environmental risks or alternatives;" or (3) whether the agency
made irretrievable commitments to a predetermined course of
action."0 Certainly, some of these indicators overlap with one
another-and other factors might also evidence "steamrolling."
But these three begin to flesh out the concern that an agency
might pursue a predetermined result entirely impervious-
substantively, at least-to NEPA. Accordingly, there is concern that
final agency choices will be the same as the originally proposed
projects despite environmental concerns. 2 In this scenario, no
consideration is given to environmental concerns that might force
a decisional change. Certainly, this would not fulfill NEPA; courts
should consider whether a final decision might have been reached
as a result of steamrolling behavior.0 3 For example, would
the project with tunnel vision.") (emphasis added).
99. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Pac. Rivers
Council v. Thomas, Civil No. 92-1322-MA, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21351, at *17-18 (D. Or.
1994) (stating that in cases arising under the Endangered Species Act, the challenged
activities do not involve the commitment of "vast financial resources," and thus, "the
potential to 'steamroll' these projects through without the benefit of prior consultation to
secure its completion is not threatened"); Puerto Rico Conservation Found. v. Larson, 797
F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (D. P.R. 1992) (granting a preliminary injunction where injury was the
"result of improper agency decision to steamroll the implementation of its plans").
100. See infra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text.
101. These "steamroll indictors" used to determine whether environmental concerns
are given any weight in the NEPA process might be considered a subset of Judge
Leventhal's "danger signals" used to determine whether an agency has "really taken a
'hard look' at the salient problems" as required by the APA. See Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
102. The NEPA process is similar to the notice and comment procedures of agency
decisions and rulemaking in that both attempt to influence decision-making. See Natural
Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating
that the final permit, granted under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System,
"need not be identical to the to the draft permit" because "[t]hat would be antithetical to
the whole concept of notice and comment."); Trans-Pac. Freight Conference of
Japan/Korea v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 650 F.2d 1235, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The whole
rationale of notice and comment rests on the expectation that the final rules will be
somewhat different and improved from the rules originally proposed by the agency.").
103. "Bad faith" is another situation in which courts should engage in more
searching review of agency action-but courts often use this term carelessly. "Bad faith"
occurs where an agency intentionally fails to disclose information (for example, the
presence of a protected species) or engages in corruption. Courts are permitted to depart
from the administrative record in these cases, and proof could be sufficient for a court to
award declaratory and injunctive relief. This Article is concerned with situations in which
mission-oriented agencies exercise inadequate "consideration," not situations in which
agencies engage in intentional deceit or corruption. While some courts might view this
systemic problem as engaging NEPA in "bad faith," see infta notes 109 & 113, courts would
still be allowed to depart from the administrative record in these cases and determine if all
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environmental concerns have ever provoked a decisional change in
that particular agency's process? In other words, hard look review
is triggered when the final proposed action is identical to initial
agency recommendation prior to the consideration of
environmental risks pursuant to NEPA.
Consider the first steamrolling indicator above. If a court finds
that an agency's NEPA process was a "charade" or "the outcome a
'foregone conclusion"' because no weight was given to
environmental concerns, then the court should strike down the
agency decision as arbitrary and capricious. 4
Courts recognize the difficulty in proving that an agency would
not have changed its initial choice regardless of the environmental
harms the NEPA process forecast. After all, an agency must plan
ahead to be effective; discussions between agency decision-makers
and public officials will necessarily take place before a final decision
is made. °5 Nevertheless, courts can, and should, evaluate these
discussions and other extrinsic evidence when steamroll indicators
are present. A thorough evaluation of an agency's deliberations
may well reveal the extent to which the agency was, at the time of
the NEPA process, honestly open to altering its project based on
new information about the project's likely environmental effects.
The second steamroll indicator listed above is closely related;
ignoring science that might undermine a decision 6 or relying on
scientific methodology that leads to obviously inaccurate results °7
relevant factors have been considered. See supra note 96. That is, this Article's analysis
remains relevant in "bad faith" cases, even though courts' power to offer relief in these
cases goes beyond this Article's purview.
104. County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368,1390 (2d Cir. 1977). See
also Australians for Animals v. Evans, No. C-04-0086 SC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 753, at *5
(N.D. Ca. 2004) (suggesting that if evidence demonstrated "[a] basis for any assertion that
Defendants deliberately ignored evidence, manipulated the process or engaged in
otherwise objectionable behavior," the APA would be violated); Thousand Friends of Iowa
v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1205-06 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (complaint
alleging manipulation of the NEPA review process by colluding and agreement to
preconstruction projects prior to completion of NEPA review process).
105. County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1389 (quoting lower courts that have found it
"[un]realistic to assume that discussion and debate among high public officials and
decisionmakers will not take place prior to a final decision").
106. See Rybachek v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 1297 (9th Cir. 1990)
(reviewing whether "EPA failed to comply with its statutory mandate by not truthfully
considering environmental impacts other than water quality or by considering them only
superficially"). See also Stewart Park & Reserve Coal, Inc. v. Slater, 352 F.3d 545, 558-59 (2d
Cir. 2003) (finding that defendants did not "whitewash" traffic and transportation data by
ignoring it or withholding it from the EIS).
107. See Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 972 (9th Cir. 2002)
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would indicate that an agency's decision-making process violated
the APA. As suggested earlier, there is always a possibility that an
agency might ignore information about environmental risks while
plodding "through the NEPA motions in order to validate the
decisions previously made." ' But the second steamroll indicator is
useful nonetheless, suggesting a more precise and searching review
by courts in order to determine whether the APA's mandate that
an agency weigh the environmental costs under NEPA-even if
little weight is given-is genuinely satisfied.
Finally, as the third steamroll indicator suggests, evidence that
an agency has acted on a project before a final decision is made
suggests that the agency gave no weight to environmental
considerations in its process."°  Courts should search for
irretrievable commitments to a pre-selected alternative.' The
NEPA regulations, created by CEQ require that environmental
impact statements and environmental assessments "serve as the
means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed agency
actions, rather than justifying decisions already made.""' "Agencies
shall not commit resources prejudicing selection of alternatives
before making a final decision.""2 Irretrievable commitments can
include money, tangible resources such as labor and raw materials,
or pre-existing political and policy commitments that demand a
(finding that the Forest Service's methodology did not "reasonably ensure viable
populations of the species at issue").
108. County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1389 (quoting the district court).
109. See, e.g., Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 840-41, 849 (W.D. Mich. 1999)
(denying motion for preliminary injunction because of the weighty governmental
executive interests in foreign policy and nuclear non-proliferation, despite plaintiffs
argument that the assessment was made in bad faith, as evidenced by the fact that the U.S.
Department of Energy began fabricating the fuel roads for transport even before the
Environmental Assessment was started). But see also City of Oak Creek v. Milwaukee Metro.
Sewerage Dist., 576 F. Supp. 482, 488-90 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (holding that NEPA does not
require an agency to "refrain from committing resources toward the acquisition of a
proposed landfill site until the environmental consequences.., are presented and
considered," despite plaintiff's assertion that these expenditures would preclude
meaningful weight to environmental consequences). Irretrievable commitments, while not
per se violations of NEPA, may indicate that due weight has not been given to
environmental consequences. In order to prevail, plaintiffs must provide evidence that
shows the project was a foregone conclusion, and that resources were expended prior to
consideration of alternatives. See Becker v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 999 F. Supp. 240, 244-45 (D.
Conn. 1996).
110. Hirt, 127 F. Supp. at 841 (noting that commitment of resources is not bad faith
per se, but raises that possibility).
111. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(g) (2005).
112. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(f) (2005).
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given choice."'
The presence of steamroll indicators such as these suggests that
an agency has exercised its will and not its judgment, and that it
has failed to consider environmental factors as NEPA requires."4
Inquiry into these "steamroll indicators" may reveal that an agency
gave no weight to environmental considerations-or it might
reveal that even though these factors were present, environmental
concerns had a role in the decision-making. But the failure to give
environmental concerns any weight means these concerns had no
effect on the final decision-making process. Only through a more
searching review of the NEPA process, as required by the APA, can
courts ensure that agencies might actually change their minds on
the basis of environmental factors. 5
Of course, this implicates the crux of the substantive-
procedural dilemma: courts cannot substantively evaluate agency
actions, and so unless the courts employ strict procedural
evaluations, agency NEPA decisions are largely unreviewable. A
question emerges as to whether or not agencies can always claim
that they gave some weight to environmental considerations,
simply making NEPA a paperwork-generating statute. For example,
couldn't an agency considering placement of a landfill simply
explain in its EIS that landfills cause land degradation and may
have adverse groundwater implications-and then state that these
considerations were not determinative? That is, are the cost-benefit
calculations involving environmental harms almost always
uncertain enough that a savvy agency decision-maker could make a
plausible claim that the benefits of the project outweigh the
environmental harms? Such a criticism, however valid, misses
113. Hirt, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (explaining that when evaluating plaintiffs' bad
faith claim, the court found most convincing the defendants' "extensive testimony that the
United States has a political strategy to use the shipment of American MOX rods as
political leverage .... This strategy, which the United States has evidently pursued for a
long time, combined with the fact that the MOX rods were fabricated before the EA was
even started... suggests a likelihood that DOE had already committed itself to the
Parallex Project long before the EA was completed").
114. Judge Leventhal stated that a court must intervene "if [it] becomes aware,
especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a
'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
115. This is consistent with CEQ regulations. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (2005)
("The agency shall make every effort to disclose and discuss at appropriate points in the
draft statement all major points of view on the environmental impacts of the alternatives
including the proposed action.").
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NEPA's central consideration; even under its most
environmentally friendly reading, NEPA does not call for courts to
examine the cost-benefit decision, but rather to evaluate the
process-an evaluation that necessarily supposes that agencies'
process is sufficient, or at least useful, in assessing the character of
the decision made.
By looking collectively at steamroll indicators such as those this
Article identifies, courts can engage in a searching review of the
NEPA process that scrutinizes agency decision-making processes.
Through use of steamroll indicators, courts can attempt to ferret
out agencies that do not engage in a good faith effort to follow
through with NEPA and the APA (i.e., those agencies that follow
NEPA's procedures, but eschew meaningful cost-benefit calculus
because environmental concerns will always lose).
Additionally, skeptics might suggest that if a court recognizes
evidence of steamroll indicators (such as an irretrievable
commitment of resources) such evidence is insufficient to compel
relief because it will be difficult to prove that an agency gave zero
weight to environmental concerns (plaintiff wins) versus little
weight (plaintiff loses) because the agency satisfactorily completed
its NEPA documents. But this concern misunderstands both the
problem and the remedy. If significant steamroll indicators exist,
the problem is "consideration," which may result in insufficient
weight. The APA's remedy is further agency explanation, only after
which can a winner or loser be declared based on the
appropriateness of the weight given to environmental
consequences that likely will then result in an agency win. Thus,
regardless of the amount of weight given to environmental
concerns in an individual case, judicial hard look in the NEPA
context changes in the institutional relationship between the
courts and agencies. Application of the hard look doctrine here
would force agencies to better explain their decisions, to explain
why they engaged in those factors that suggest they were mission-
oriented, to avoid any ignorance of certain environmental
concerns, or to wait to spend significant resources on a project.
Any option agencies choose will increase the likelihood that the
project can change during the course of the decision-making
process.
VI. APPLICATION OF APA HARD LOOK REVIEW TO NEPA
To illustrate how courts would use these "steamroll indicators,"
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consider City of Oak Creek v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage
District.16 The Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD)
sought to build a landfill facility in Oak Creek, a suburb of
Milwaukee." 7  Although MMSD admitted that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) still needed to complete
an EIS in order for the landfill construction to proceed,"' MMSD
began condemnation proceedings to acquire the property and
began spending federal funds for planning purposes."9 Plaintiffs
(the City of Oak Creek and owners of the land proposed to be
taken) argued that if MMSD continued to make expenditures to
acquire the landfill property, then MMSD would be "presented
with a fait accompli when it finally decides whether to begin
construction of a landfill facility at the Oak Creek location."2 °
Thus, plaintiffs argued, "[t]he condemnation and site acquisition
activities will place so much momentum behind the selection of
[the] site ... that a full and fair consideration of environmental
consequences will be impossible."2 ' The court held that NEPA
does not require the preparation of an EIS before site acquisition
activities are undertaken.
This conclusion makes some sense in light of the intended role
of NEPA. 22 While making such commitments raises flags that an
agency may have steamrolled to its preferred choice, this is not
necessarily so; irretrievable commitments do not always mean that
an EIS was improperly prepared,'23 or that it did not influence
decision-making. On the other hand, irretrievable commitments
undoubtedly provide evidence to bolster plaintiffs' assertion to the
contrary, and a court could engage in an inquiry-looking at the
steamroll indicators collectively-as to whether any weight was
given to environmental considerations. In this scenario, the
plaintiffs would argue that the agencies exhibited tunnel vision,
and would present other evidence suggesting that no
116. City of Oak Creek v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 576 F.Supp. 482 (E. D.
Wis. 1983).
117. Id. at 484.
118. Id. at 488.
119. Id. at 489.
120. Id. at 488.
121. Id.
122. Although, this likely contradicts CEQ regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(f)
(2005).
123. City of Oak Creek, 576 F. Supp. at 489 n.2.
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environmental concerns could have sidetracked the foregone
conclusion of the original proposed project. If a court agreed, it
should declare the NEPA process unlawful as arbitrary and
capricious under the APA. The court would not declare the final
decision wrong, but would declare the decision-making process
improper. The court could then remand the decision back to the
agency for consideration of environmental harms. A skeptic of this
process might suggest that this is all likely to be futile, since the
decision would be remanded back to the same agency -an agency
whose processes would have already been deemed questionable.
This criticism, however, is subject to the same refutation as its
counterpart above; that is, NEPA's purpose is to ensure process,
not results. And in any case, an agency under such severe scrutiny
would be likely to reform its NEPA processes in some manner.
Following remand, the agency could then, as required by the
APA, support its decision with an explanation of the weight given
to environmental concerns and how the project benefits
outweighed these costs. 24 As stated earlier, this type of measured
cost-benefit calculation could not be overruled by a reviewing
court.12 5 This solution comports with the goal of preventing
mission-oriented agencies or corrupt influences from pervading
administrative decision-making by requiring agencies to give
124. A possible parallel can also be drawn to expanding judicial review of agency
inaction (where inaction is defined as an "instance in which an agency fails to take desired
or desirable action"). Bressman, supra note 74, at 1664. Judicial review should be
"concerned with inhibiting administrative decisionmaking that reflects narrow interests
rather than public purposes," and courts in reviewing agency non-enforcement decisions,
like decisions not to choose environmentally friendly alternatives, should require agencies
to articulate their reasons. Id. at 1660, 1686. Scholars continually debate whether such
additional agency tasks results in agency ossification. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gft
Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. LJ.
599, 605 (2004); William S. Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393 (2000); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The
Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
599 (1997). However, the question remains whether explanation in the NEPA process
results in the same "ossifying" concerns as in the informal rulemaking context. Cf John D.
Echeverria & Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural "Reform": In Defense of Environmental Right-
to-Know, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 609 (2003) (stating that the "process of agency
'ossification' catalyzed by extensive judicial review means that agencies will launch fewer
new initiatives to protect public health and the environment").
125. See Bressman, supra note 74, at 1697 ("If an agency bases a nonenforcement
decision on legitimate reasons of resource allocation and priority setting, then it is entitled
to demand judicial respect.").
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explanations for their decisions, accompanied by judicial review. 126
VII. CONCLUSION
For proponents of an enforcement of NEPA adequate to its
actual textual mandate, NEPA's merely procedural construction is
disappointing. Giving little weight to environmental factors in
agency decision-making does not run afoul of NEPA or the APA.
But at the very least, existing law suggests that giving no weight to
environmental factors is arbitrary and capricious, and courts can
engage in a searching review of the administrative record to ensure
that the environment plays some role in the decision-making
process. By looking at a collection of steamroll indicators-such as
ignoring scientific data, making irretrievable commitments, and
exhibiting tunnel vision-courts can, and should, prevent agencies
from simply going through NEPA's procedural motions to reach a
preferred policy choice, impervious to environmental concerns.
The APA requires that reasoned analysis under NEPA gives weight
to environmental factors in the decision-making process, and that,
once these factors are considered, agencies must explain how
these are trumped by other benefits. Only through comprehensive
agency explanation of the weight given to environmental costs, in
a decision-making record thorough enough to survive hard look
review, can "environmental concerns be integrated into the very
process of agency decisionmaking"'' 7 with the potential of
facilitating an environmentally friendly decisional change-which
is, after all, NEPA's goal.
126. See also id. at 1693-94.
127. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981) (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979)).
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